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ings for their business clients, would, if applied to loyalty adjudications,
probably invalidate every adverse one to date; and that the Bar Association-
remain silent on this subject. He might also have noted that when the Presi-
dent changed the standard of dismissal in 1951 from proof of disloyal y to
"reasonable doubt" as to loyalty, a distinguished partner of Mr. Horskys
was one of the few lawyers in or out of Washington to raise his voice in
protest at this change in the Anglo-Saxon burden of proof.0 And now even
the loyalty boards are apparently to be abolished, and without a word oi
protest from the lawyer-citizen, or any suggestions by lawyers as to alterna-
tive procedures for assuring a fair hearing. Here again an organized Federal
Bar, brought into being by the new Attorney General, might exercise the
proper "influence" of the profession as the defender and guardian of our
ancient liberties. I cannot improve on Mr. Horsky's summation of the matter:
"We have an obligation, as members of the legal profession, to
examine these procedural problems. That one may decide on the
umvisdom of complete disclosure of every counter-espionage agent
in every loyalty case does not mean that we need go to the other ex-
treme and maintain an almost total anonymity of accusers or adverse
witnesses. That specification of charges may necessarily be limited
in occasional instances by security considerations does not mean that
sweeping, general allegations should be the rule. That it might L
unwise to permit an unlimited right in the accused to subpoena wit-
nesses does not mean that the right to subpoena should be wholly
denied. Is there not a need for a fundamental reexamination of the
concept of guilt by association? These are basic matters, where a
whittling away of safeguards is portentous for us all."' 0
LLox-D N. CUTLERj
COnpORATioN GVING. By F. Emerson Andrews. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1952. Pp. 361. $4.50.
FoR the most part, this is pretty thin stuff. It is supposed to be a little
helper for business executives looking for "efficient procedures and creative
patterns for their gifts."' There isn't much in it that a young girl fresh out of
library school and waiting to get married couldn't locate in a day and a half.
But the business executive isn't the only beneficiary of this compilation with
comments from the top of Mr. Andrews' head-lawyers, bankers, other busi-
ness consultants, colleges, welfare agencies, other fund solicitors, stockholders,
9. O'Brian, ,Ycw Eixwroac1tzwn on Individual Freedom, d6 Hx,,.v. L. RE%,. 1 (1952).
10. p. 167.
- Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. Publisher's Prospectus, p. 2, distributed with letter dated November 23, 1952. The
author is the publisher's Director of Publications.
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and taxpayers are invited to bring their chairs right up to the table, too.2 Any-
one who accepts the invitation had better get a sandwich first.
There are a number of ways to state the problem, but what they all come
down to is that many deserving things which cannot possibly be organized
to pay their own ways need to be done; a number of these are not, and perhaps
should not be, charged directly against tax revenue and performed by govern-
ments; corporations that make money are a possible source of support; bene-
factions from individuals and unincorporated associations do not presently
come near furnishing the support these causes can well use, if they ever did;
ergo, let us add the corporate almoner to the mailing list. Hear the pleader of
just one good cause:
"Here, as I indicated in my last Report and as others have demon-
strated in detail, the financial resources of our corporations-the
greatest of all reservoirs of private wealth in our society-that might
be made available to our universities are backed up behind a log jam
of legal and administrative obstacles that permits only a faint trickle
to escape."
That was President Griswold, reporting to Yale alumni on the last academic
year.
8
Now there is a mass of very current and not all necessarily choice literature
on the subject of these legal and administrative obstacles.4 The editor of a
corporation law service for students has even felt the issues sufficiently stir-
ring to catch the interest of law students and has this year distributed to stu-
dent subscribers a problem fact situation and selected bibliography on the sub-
ject.0 Reported administrative and judicial adjudication deals largely with
questions of corporate power to give and the income tax deductibility of bene-
factions. Legislatures have recently been dealing with both matters. In the
former area, they seem to have been mildly rushing to pass legislation en-
abling corporations to dispense "cakes and ale" with little or no regard for
special corporate benefit.6 The Congress has been proceeding in the opposite
direction in the latter area to hedge the corporate income tax "loophole" of
gift deductibility, 7 later inviting increasing individual giving through increased
deductibility from gross income for individual benefactions.8 Neither trend
2. Ibid.
3. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF YALE UNIVERSITY TO THE ALUmINI, 1951-1952,
p. 7 (1952).
4. E.g., Bleicken, Corporate Contributions to Charities: The Moder Rule, 38
A.B.A.J. 999 (1952); Pollard, Corporation Support of Higher Education, 30 HARV. Bus.
REV. 111 (1952).
5. JENNINGS, P-H STUDENTs CORP. SERV., REPORT No. 8, p. 1 (1953).
6. Bleicken, supra note 4, at 1060.
7. Revenue Act of 1950, §§ 321(a), 331, 64 STAT. 954-5, 957-8 (1950), INT. REV. CODE
§§ 162(g) (2), 3813.
8. Pub. L. No. 465, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (July 8, 1952), INT. REV. CODE § 23
(o) (increasing from 15 to 20 percent of adjusted gross income the amount of contri-
butions an individual income taxpayer may deduct).
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collects any obvious justification as it rolls along. Granted that taxation of
both corporate and stockholder dividend income is presently an abiding feature
of federal and state income taxation which has the result of permitting cor-
porate giving to reach the donee with the least tax attrition and often very
odd corporate tax advantages ;9 granted that it is easier to solicit a few gift-
minded corporations than many individual stockholders; still the corporation
is only an almoner for its shareholders. The stockholder hires the business
management of his corporation. Must he, at the same time, hire his giving
management? Is giving power to be concentrated as some say economic power
has been ?1o Money in business corporation hands is not necessarily fair game
for all comers. In fact, much of any money unreasonably accumulated as sur-
plus beyond business needs now quite properly draws a special tax penalty?,
Individual large fortunes may be declining, but what of the possibility that,
as redistributed among the population, wealth may constitute an ample-if
troublesome to solicit-resource for giving? It is not yet too late to consider
these fundamental questions of corporate giving. Maybe tax attrition should
be reduced by giving stockholders an option to divert corporate dividends to
donees without incurring taxable net income to either corporation or share-
holder. Perhaps there are better reconciliations of revenue needs, business
management as a specialty, needs of donees, economic concentration, and in-
dividual freedom to give.
But Mr. Andrews chooses to pass these questions and to say, not unreason-
ably, "Corporate giving is here. How shall it best be done?" This is his selec-
tion-of-problem phase. Unfortunately, he scarcely illuminates its solution at all.
Part I of his book is subtitled, "Corporate Giving." Apparently designed to
set up the problem phase for discussion, furnish historical perspective and a
digest of present practices, this part concludes that the corporation has
emerged in the last decade as a giant giver more than offsetting the decline
in really large individual gifts, but that it has been a custom-bound and non-
creative giver.'2 This sounds possible and may even be true, but it is an ab-
solutely unproved thesis. The data culled from Bureau of Internal Revenue
and other fairly available sources, coupled with the uneven returns to a ques-
tionnaire by 326 out of some 600,000 corporations, does not take up the gap
between fact and intuition.' 3 Caveat reader. Here are some didactic samples:
5 percent of all "annual" giving is by corporations, based on nothing; 14 giving
9. On the oddities, see LAssEr, How TAx Ltws M.Anr- GrviNG ro CHAMrT- EAsY
c. 10 (1948) (not current in some respects under the present statute).
10. BERLE & MEA.N s, THE MODmN CoRPoaATIoN AND PRIVATE PEoPr=r" (1932) is
of course the classic here.
11. INT. Rnv. CODE § 102.
12. Pp. 125-8.
13. Pp. 64, 268-271. While the author recognizes the inadequacy of the survey, he has
not the resolution to throw it away and constantly asserts its validity by implication.
14. At-page 19 of the present work, we are referred to an earlier work of the same
author, PHILANTHROPIc GIVING (1950), for the truth of this statement. Running th
down leads merely to printed guesses.
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
is in reverse ratio to geographic income concentration, based on warmed over
1941 data ;15 colleges and universities rank fourth as donees of corporations,
based on National Industrial Conference Board data published in 1948 ;10 few
corporations plan giving, based on the 326-company survey ;17 and worthiness
of cause outranks corporate benefit as a motive for giving, based on the same
survey.'
8
Part II, subtitled "The Beneficiaries," presumably is designed as a tip-off
against the unscrupulous and as a restatement of the obvious and previously-
printed stories of voluntary welfare agencies, community trusts, and the like.
There is not a pennyworth of suggestion as to how a corporation is to give
creatively unless one counts the remarks that it is a tough job, a great oppor-
tunity, and the corporation ought to organize for. it.10
The final part deals with legal and taxation factors on which a well-known
Chicago lawyer has advised.20 At least these 40-some pages contain no in-
tuition presented as gospel, although they tend at one point to scramble the
powers and tax cases unduly.2' The skimming is of the orthodox questions
which have been adjudicated. There is no anticipation here of problems await-
ing litigation but not yet reflected in reported cases. For example, the real
litigious possibility of conflict of fiduciary responsibility in the case of cor-
porate directors who interlock with another giving foundation (non-profit
corporation or trust) formed to level out corporate giving is not even bruited.
The interlocking directors certainly serve at least two masters, without men-
tioning the corporate stockholders, some of whom may be, incidentally, en-
dowment trustees of competing donees.
There are voluminous appendices, including case lists, statutes in hacc vcrba,
and, certainly of prime utility, a sample foundation charter under the New
York Membership Corporation Law which is most inadequate. "22
Mr. Andrews would perhaps have benefited his public by collecting his
intuitions in a pamphlet or a magazine article. He simply does not furnish a





18. P. 115, with 248 corporations used as a basis.
19. Pages 120-2 excerpt from publications of the National Industrial Conference
Board and the American Society of Corporate Secretaries. There are some excerpts from
corporation questionnaire responses, but the text states all I can find of the author's con-
tribution.
20. MT. Ray Garrett.
21. Pp. 231-2. The tax deduction cases, for example, do not present questions of
corporate power to give under a state enabling act and certificate of incorporation,
22. Suggestions as to practice under this and analogous statutes can be gleaned from
the collection, CHAMBERS, CHARTERS OF PHILANTHROPIES (1948).
"IProfessor of Law, The State University of Iowa.
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